The aesthetical is the new place for philosophy of individuation, even for rationalisms concerned with this topic, since individuation is more and more finding its territory there. In his book on Nietzsche, Heidegger writes:
"The train of thought continues as Plato interposes a striking antithesis: 'But to beauty alone has the role been alloted [i.e., in the essential order of Being's illumination] to be the most radiant, but also the most enchanting.' The beautiful is what advances most directly upon us and captivates us. While encountering us as a being, however, it at the same time liberates us to the view upon Being. The beuatiful is an element which is disparate within itself; it grants entry into immediate sensuous appearances and yet at the same time soars toward Being; it is both captivating and liberating. Hence it is the beautiful that snatches us from oblivion of Being and grants the view upon Being" (196, Vol. 1, Trans. Farrell Krell).
In this pasage one can trace echoes of Agamben, Deleuze and Simondon, Luhmann and Maturana and Varela. in his magnificent little book, the Open, Agamben had already drawn out the relations in Heidegger's thought between the aesthetic, the animal, and its disinhibitors, that which captivates a being, disclosing a world to it. And of course, Simondon's concepts of transduction, and disparation match well with these aesthetical themes and terms.
Sunday, January 28, 2007
Eros and The Outside, Heidegger, Simondon, Deleuze
From Heidegger's "Nietzsche,"
"The consequence for man of the concealment of Being is that he is overcome by lethe, that concealment of Being which gives rise to the illusion that there is no such thing as Being. We translate the Greek word lethe as "forgetting," although in such a way that "to forget" is thought in a metaphysical, not a psychological manner. The majority of men sink into oblivion of Being, although--or precisely because--they constantly have to do solely with the things that are in their vicinity. For such things are not beings; they are only such things, "of which we now say that they are." Whatever matters to us and makes a claim on us here and now, in this way or that way, as this or that thing, is-- to the extent that it is at all--only an approximation to Being. It is but a fleeting appearance of Being. But those who lapse into oblivion of Being do not even know of the appearance as an appearance. For otherwise they would at the same time have to know of Being, which comes to the fore even in fleeting appearances, although "just barely." They would then emerge from oblivion of Being. Instead of being slaves to oblivion, they would preserve mneme in recollective thought on Being. "Only a few remain who have at their disposal the capacity to remember Being." But even these few are not able without further ado to see the appearance of what they encounter in such a way that the Being in it comes to the fore for them. Particular conditions must be fulfilled. Depending on how Being gives itself, the power of self-showing in the Idea becomes proper to it, and therewith the attracting and binding force. As soon as man lets himself be bound by Being in his view upon it, he is cast beyond himself, so that he is stretched, as it were between himself and Being and is outside himself. Such elevation beyond oneself and such being drawn toward Being itself is eros. Only to the extent that Being is able to elicit "erotic" power in its relation to man is man capable of thinking about Being and overcoming oblivion of Being" (194,195. V. 1, Trans. Farrell Krell).
1. The philosophical tradition says that Being gives itself, via a self-showing of its Idea, only to the human; whereas Being gives itself to animals, say, in an utterly banal and inconsequential way. Being, via its Idea, which must be gathered [recollected] by the human, attracts and binds the human. Here Heidegger writes that the human must let himself be bound by Being thusly. This defines a certain relationship to the Idea which is Greek, but one would have to be weary to say [German] Idealist. Being, via the Idea, gives itself over to the human, rending or stretching the human, which then attempts to master the Idea by technology or abandons himself to it, like a shepherd. This is how Agamben treats the problem, in any case. But what is at issue here is the question of thinking Being in this manner, as given over to the human, as the human lets Being be, is stretched, this is the activity of thinking the Outside. Or the Open.
2. One is intrigued by Heidegger's statements on eros. One cannot subordinate the effort of thought by recollection or memory, such as the Bergsonian virtual, or Heideggerian aletheia. But one may not anthropomorphize or leave mystical the effort.
3. An alternative, but perhaps we still cannot do without a de-anthropomorphized method of recollection, to thinking the Outside is given in individuation seen from the point of view not of the individual, but from the point of view of the process of individuation of individuals. A la Simondon/Deleuze.
"The consequence for man of the concealment of Being is that he is overcome by lethe, that concealment of Being which gives rise to the illusion that there is no such thing as Being. We translate the Greek word lethe as "forgetting," although in such a way that "to forget" is thought in a metaphysical, not a psychological manner. The majority of men sink into oblivion of Being, although--or precisely because--they constantly have to do solely with the things that are in their vicinity. For such things are not beings; they are only such things, "of which we now say that they are." Whatever matters to us and makes a claim on us here and now, in this way or that way, as this or that thing, is-- to the extent that it is at all--only an approximation to Being. It is but a fleeting appearance of Being. But those who lapse into oblivion of Being do not even know of the appearance as an appearance. For otherwise they would at the same time have to know of Being, which comes to the fore even in fleeting appearances, although "just barely." They would then emerge from oblivion of Being. Instead of being slaves to oblivion, they would preserve mneme in recollective thought on Being. "Only a few remain who have at their disposal the capacity to remember Being." But even these few are not able without further ado to see the appearance of what they encounter in such a way that the Being in it comes to the fore for them. Particular conditions must be fulfilled. Depending on how Being gives itself, the power of self-showing in the Idea becomes proper to it, and therewith the attracting and binding force. As soon as man lets himself be bound by Being in his view upon it, he is cast beyond himself, so that he is stretched, as it were between himself and Being and is outside himself. Such elevation beyond oneself and such being drawn toward Being itself is eros. Only to the extent that Being is able to elicit "erotic" power in its relation to man is man capable of thinking about Being and overcoming oblivion of Being" (194,195. V. 1, Trans. Farrell Krell).
1. The philosophical tradition says that Being gives itself, via a self-showing of its Idea, only to the human; whereas Being gives itself to animals, say, in an utterly banal and inconsequential way. Being, via its Idea, which must be gathered [recollected] by the human, attracts and binds the human. Here Heidegger writes that the human must let himself be bound by Being thusly. This defines a certain relationship to the Idea which is Greek, but one would have to be weary to say [German] Idealist. Being, via the Idea, gives itself over to the human, rending or stretching the human, which then attempts to master the Idea by technology or abandons himself to it, like a shepherd. This is how Agamben treats the problem, in any case. But what is at issue here is the question of thinking Being in this manner, as given over to the human, as the human lets Being be, is stretched, this is the activity of thinking the Outside. Or the Open.
2. One is intrigued by Heidegger's statements on eros. One cannot subordinate the effort of thought by recollection or memory, such as the Bergsonian virtual, or Heideggerian aletheia. But one may not anthropomorphize or leave mystical the effort.
3. An alternative, but perhaps we still cannot do without a de-anthropomorphized method of recollection, to thinking the Outside is given in individuation seen from the point of view not of the individual, but from the point of view of the process of individuation of individuals. A la Simondon/Deleuze.
On Life
From Heidegger's Nietzsche:
"Life...more mysterious since the day the great liberator came over me--the thought that life should be an experiment of knowers."
--The Gay Science 1882 (Book IV, no. 324)
From David Ferrell Krell Trans.
"Life...more mysterious since the day the great liberator came over me--the thought that life should be an experiment of knowers."
--The Gay Science 1882 (Book IV, no. 324)
From David Ferrell Krell Trans.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)